Snit, In Game
Most of baseball analysis is devoted to the analysis of players. The sabermetric revolution revolves around the notion that players are reasonably easy to evaluate because they have at most two jobs: score runs for their teams and stopping the other team from scoring runs. Since we have a really good handle on the causes of runs, and to the extent that we have good data on those causes, we are in a good position to evaluate player. Of course, we will still miss a lot: is the player a good teammate? Does he help other players get better? Is he a douche? But we get a pretty good handle on what we have decided is the main thing about players.
Not so managers. Bill James spent a lot of time thinking about how to evaluate managers, and as far as I know he gave up. They do so many things and so many of them are so poorly defined (“maintain team morale”) that he just didn’t see a great way to do it. Of course, he could criticize (sometimes really harshly) particular decisions by particular managers against data on the viability of that strategy (e.g. Chuck Tanner‘s decision to bat the on-base void that was Omar Moreno leadoff) but judging managers against each other in aggregate was something I don’t think he was ever willing to do. (I welcome correction if I’m wrong about this.)
I always thought Bobby Cox was an unbelievably great manager who was at best an average in-game decision guy. But that just came from me yelling at the screen at particular decisions while watching his teams succeed year after year. In my immersion in the 1988 Baseball Abstract, I came across this:
It has always been my belief, and still is, that with the very rare exception where a manager does something really, really stupid, it is impossible to prove that any game-level decision is correct or incorrect…. [W]e will never know enough, and never be able to build simulations complex enough, to tell us with anything approaching reliability whether or not the manager chose the right option. I don’t know, and you don’t know and in truth the manager doesn’t know either. He chooses cetain biases by which to make a selection, and throws his fate to the wind…. [Managers have to make a difference, but] as important as they might be, these decisions are beyond the ability of sabermetrics to evaluate. As a fan, I think John McNamara is a dolt. As an analyst, I try to steer clear of game-level decisions.
James wrote this before managers routinely employed in-game advisors, bench coaches. But I think the general point still applies. What’s interesting to me is that the negatives about Snit seem entirely focused on three issues:
- How long to leave in a starting pitcher. Fan’s opinion: too slow a hook
- Using low leverage relievers in high leverage situations: Fan’s opinion. Snit is too committed to an Order and a standard list of a) a short list of guys for the last three innings and b) a bunch of other guys to fill innings when you’re losing
- Not giving his regulars enough rest. A complementary complaint to this is a willingness to carry a very weak bench
I’m following James here. I have no data, and I’m not sure exactly what data you’d want to collect to begin to look at any of these questions. For what it’s worth, while I think any of these complaints can be leveled in any particular game, I don’t see any of these as systemic failures. And a lot of them are, as James said, hunches that didn’t pay off.
What do y’all think?
The Game
Shabbos Schwellenbach gave up runs for the first time in the first inning: a two run shot by Jonah Bride. Another solo shot by Jake Berger made it 3-0. Meanwhile, Valente Bellozo, which I believe is an Italian scooter model with a governor that ensures its top speed is 91 mph, was getting the Braves out on junk. Lest anybody misunderstand, that’s a compliment. Greg Maddux threw junk. The hitless streak was broken in the bottom of the fifth with an Orlando Arcia homer that made it 3-1. When Whit Merrifield led off the 6th with a triple, Valente Bellozo (a small Tuscan winery producing an acceptable Rosso di Montalcino) was replaced by Anthony Bender (doesn’t someone with that name have to specialize in a curveball?) Jorge Soler struck out, but Austin Riley jit a groundout that scored Merrifield to make it 3-2. (This will come up in my piece next week on runners on third with no outs. Routine play like this that brings a run home is forgotten, while the times a team fails are magnified.)
Bellozo (a small-circulation magazine out of Turin that specializes in photographs of beautiful women in clown outfits) threw only 66 pitches. The decision to remove him is one of those decisions like the ones James describes above. There’s simply no way to decide whether that decision was right or wrong.
Shabbos struck out 10 and walked none in his seven innings. But still left the game trailing by 1 owing to those two homers.
Kevin Faucher (a charter member of the all-Frog team along with Francoeur) took the 8th for the Fish and was filleted. The game was tied with small ball — lead off walk by Jarred Kelenic, bunt by Merrifield and a single from Jorge Soler. Then, big ball — a double from Austin Riley put men on 2nd and third with one out, followed by a Marcell Ozuna sac fly that gave the Braves the lead and a single from Arcia padded it to 5-3.
Joe Jiménez was called on to pitch the 9th: K; swinging bunt single; K; BB; K. Just like last night, the Marlins got the go-ahead run to the plate. But making that batter Vidal Brujan was closer to Rick Camp than to last night’s Jake Burger. Still, even Camp….
Lather. Rinse. Repeat.
Managerial Dermis
Its a generational thing, obviously, but has any manager had more tattoos than Skip Schumacher? There are no good tat stats that I could find.
Announcing
Is the video of Braves games on a brief delay? I’ve been noticing lately that Gaudin has been calling strikeouts before that strikeout is completed on my screen. The delay is no more than a half-second or so, but it’s been really noticeable to me lately. I suspect I never noticed it with Chip because he was just slow to react. I don’t notice it on balls hit because that half-second is needed to judge a likely result. Anybody else notice this? Does it bother you?
Mr. Aaron
It is Hank Aaron Week and the celebration continues. I love Hank Aaron, but I’m not nearly as eloquent about it as tfloyd, so I’ll just wait for his next encomium. But as far as I’m concerned, they could have Hank Aaron Week every week. Well, maybe Hank could share one with Rico Carty.
And now…
Switching over to watch the Phillies. Go get ’em Mariners.
I’ve been noticing the strike out call coming in a bit early since at least last year, but I’ve been assuming it’s a mlb.tv thing which doesn’t make a whole lot of sense when I actually stop to think about it.
good to see the braves when didn’t roll over after going down early.
It is something that started last year in the playoffs. It’s soooo unnatural.
Okay, this might be our best win in weeks. Comeback in late innings with a whole-lineup rally. Feels like the team is pulling together.
Shabbes Schwellenbach, abi gezint ken men gliklekh zayn!
This is delightful! After the way this year has gone, may all of our remaining fellers abi gezint for the duration. (Though I’m sure I’m using that incorrectly!)
Feels like it might be 5 games back when the night is done….are these guys giving me hope again?
I watch on the Bally app and have noticed the slight earliness of the strikeout calls as well.
Manager with more tats than Schumacher: Gabe Kapler, maybe?
Great recap, thank you, JonathanF. Watch out, Phillies…
Great recap. Bill James did publish, in the late 1990’s, a guide to managers. I thought I had a copy in my shelf but can’t find it. As I recall it, it was an entertaining and informative read, but as JonathanF says, it’s more of a summary of each manager’s tendencies and preferences as opposed to an analysis of who is “better” in any quantifiable sense.
I really enjoyed Chris Jaffe’s book Evaluating Baseball’s Managers, which I have quoted from a lot over the years. (Here’s an excerpt.)
The book was basically in two parts: first, measuring the tendencies (comparing constant tinkerers like Jimy Williams and Charley Dressen); and second, attempting to measure the X-factor they may have exerted over their players, essentially by measuring player performance in year X under that manager, compared to the performance in years X-1, X-2, X+1, and X+2, based on work by Phil Birnbaum.
In the end, the results were unsurprising: the greatest manager ever was Joe McCarthy, who’s commonly considered to be greatest; Earl Weaver, Bobby Cox, and TLR were high on the list. At the time, Terry Francona did not show particularly well, but I would bet that the past 15 years since the end of the data in the book would cast him in a far more favorable light.
I think managerial analysis would be a great area for sabermetricians to return to!
Never imagined Braves Journal would be a safe space to talk about my subscription to Bellozo. Thank you, JonathanF.
I think Snit’s philosophy to only use his high leverage relievers when the team is winning has likely cost a few games, but the counter is the next game when said reliever might not be available. Also, I got really annoyed when he brought Chavez in the game last week in the 6th while winning and he gave up the lead and the team lost. It’s nitpicking, but I’d like to see a little flexibility in his relief usage. That being said, I think he’s a really great manager of people and that’s the hardest job.
Considering Chavez had an ERA less than 2 at the time, I’m not sure how you can criticize. I had my reservations, too, but hard to argue. It was a bullpen game and Chavez is often used for multiple innings or as an opener.
Agreed, Roger – also, one of the most important jobs in bullpen management is keeping your high-leverage arms healthy, and I think he’s clearly done an effective job of that.